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Abstract 
We apply the system GMM regression estimation approach on a matched sample of French firms 
listed on Euronext Paris during the period 2001-2010 to investigate the relationship between 
female directors and earnings management by considering statutory and demographic attributes 
of women directors. Primarily, we find a negative relationship between female directors and the 
magnitude of earnings management. However, this result does not hold when statutory and 
demographic attributes of women directors are taken into account, because the assessment of 
earning quality requires particular competencies and skills. Our findings thus highlight that 
business expertise and audit committee memberships are key attributes of female directors that 
promote the effective monitoring of earnings management. In contrast, women leadership and 
experience are positively related to the level of earnings management. An important implication 
of our findings is that the decision to appoint females on corporate boards should be based on 
their statutory and demographic attributes rather than on blind implementation of gender quotas. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management is generally defined as the practice of using discretionary accounting 
methods to attain desired levels of reported earnings (Gavious, Segev, & Yosef, 2012). Earnings 
management includes choosing accounting methods which provide reporting income that is 
advantageous for managers and the company but detrimental for external stakeholders (Krishnan 
& Parsons, 2008). The issue of earnings quality is discussed extensively in the accounting 
literature, and is an important area of concern for stakeholders. Earnings quality shows the extent 
to which stated earnings reveal an organization’s financial situation to interested parties. If users 
of financial data are “misled” by the level of reported income, then investors’ allocation of 
resources may be inappropriate when based on the financial statements provided by management 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Managers are professionally responsible and ethically obliged to make 
sure that concerned parties receive high quality earnings reports in a timely manner (Krishnan & 
Parsons, 2008). Following the uncovering of major accounting scams involving large 
organizations (e.g. Enron), scholars have focussed on managers’ motives for engaging in earnings 
management (Gavious et al., 2012). The literature mentions various factors, for example, debt 
covenants, pending litigation and the existence of performance-based compensation plans for 
management, that can motivate earnings management (Jones, 1991). All stakeholders and users 
of financial information require tools that can moderate managers’ tendency to engage in 
earnings management (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008).  
Several researchers have explored the impact of gender diversity on both financial reporting 
quality and earnings management (Arun, Almahrog, & Aribi, 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; 
Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Labelle, Gargouri, & Francoeur, 2010; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010; 
Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). However, this issue requires further investigation. Equivocal 
methodologies and inconsistent findings have left researchers and managers perplexed. The main 
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cause of this uncertainty is the excessive use of the agency hypothesis, which states that statutory 
diversity alone is enough to control management and provide motives to defend shareholders’ 
interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Prior studies have also focused on the number or percentage of 
female directors in examining the relationship between board gender diversity and earnings 
management. Our study broadens this approach and extends beyond research on gender 
difference by exploring the channel through which female directors exert influence on earnings 
management. Following the approach taken by Ben‐Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi, and Labelle (2013), 
we find that statutory diversity has an effect, albeit one that hinges on the individual 
characteristics or demographic attributes of board members. Statutory diversity is a measure of 
heterogeneity in the process of board composition, but is of limited influence (Ben‐Amar et al., 
2013). Demographic diversity (e.g. education, skills and experience) leads to better decision-
making by nurturing candidness and analytical decision-making among board members (Erhardt, 
Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). 
Our initial sample consists of companies belonging to the CAC All-Shares index listed on 
Euronext Paris over the period 2001-2010, during which time appointment of women on boards 
was voluntary. Indeed, our period ends prior the amendment of the gender quotas law by the 
French parliament in 2011. This legislation decrees that, from 2014, 20% of a firm’s board 
members must be women, and that this figure must rise to 40% from 2016. In our paper, we 
employ a carefully formulated methodology for dealing with firm level differences, omitted 
variables, self-selection bias and endogeneity issues. We use propensity score-matching to match 
gender-diverse firms and non-gender-diverse firms with very similar characteristics. The analysis 
serves to determine whether sample firms differ in firm-specific characteristics, regardless of the 
role of gender diversity. We apply the system GMM regression estimation approach to the 
matched sample to correct for endogeneity bias.  
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Our findings first reveal a negative association between the presence of women on board and 
the magnitude of earnings management. After statutory and demographic attributes are added to 
the regression models, the results provide evidence of a positive relationship between female 
directors and earnings management. This finding suggests that specific attributes of female 
directors may promote the effective monitoring of earnings management and may also influence 
the nature of the linkage between the proportion of female directors and earnings management. 
As regards statutory and demographic attributes, we find that business expertise and audit 
committee membership are key attributes of women directors for the detection and correction of 
earnings management. On the other hand, women’s leadership and experience are positively 
related to the level of earnings management. In a supplementary analysis, we also consider the 
case of women in two top executive positions, namely CEO and CFO, in relation to earnings 
quality (Francis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010). Our 
findings provide evidence of a negative relation between female executives (CEOs and CFOs) 
and earnings management, with a more pronounced effect for female CFOs than for female 
CEOs. 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the association between female board directorship 
and earnings management in two ways. First, we explore the black box relation between gender 
diversity and firm performance by studying the mediating effect of a large set of female directors’ 
attributes on this relation. Important implications of our findings are that the detection and the 
correction of earnings management require particular competencies and skills and the decision to 
appoint women on corporate boards should be based more on their statutory and demographic 
attributes than on blind implementation of gender quotas. Meanwhile, our recommendations may 
be still up-to-date after the implementation of the gender quota law since such law remains silent 
on the requested attributes of the directors. Second, most existing studies are based on Anglo-
American data and cannot be generalized, due to differences in governance and legal structures. 
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In this regard, our study adds to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the relation 
between board gender diversity and earnings management in a French context.  
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses and highlights 
the value of studying the French institutional background. Section 3 concisely reviews the 
literature on gender diversity, female specific attributes and the extent of earnings management, 
and puts forward the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the data, methodology and 
variables used in the study. Section 5 presents the study’s findings, and the final section contains 
our closing comments and avenues for future research. 
2. The French institutional background 
The French context is of interest for various reasons. The French civil law-based legal 
system does not offer adequate investor protection (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). Obviously enough, aggressive earnings management may occur in countries with less 
protection for minority shareholders, resulting in an environment that is more conducive to 
weaker financial reporting transparency and where managers enjoy greater discretion (Bushman, 
Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004; Duh, Lee, & Lin, 2009). Further, as noted by Faccio and Lang 
(2002), concentration of ownership and the separation of ownership and control are distinctive 
features of French institutions. These authors report that 70.92% of non-financially controlled 
firms are family owned and managed. These controlling family owners exercise control of their 
firms (Hwang and Kim, 2016) through their associated directors serving on the board (Cuervo, 
2002). Furthermore, top managers have close relationships with controlling family owners 
(Cuervo, 2002; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Boubaker & Labégorre, 2008). Concentration of ownership 
therefore probably decreases the agency problems between controlling shareholders and 
managers but provides a favourable environment for expropriating minority shareholders 
(Johnson, La Porta, Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Hence the main issue is to protect minority 
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shareholders in a meaningful way from being expropriated by controlling shareholders through 
earnings management (Chin, Chen, & Hsieh, 2009; Liu & Lu, 2007).  
The role of the board of directors and of board characteristics (i.e. board independence and 
gender diversity) is usually associated with the protection of shareholder interests (Gul et al., 
2011; Kim, Kitsabunnarat-Chatjuthamard, & Nofsinger, 2007; Liu & Lu, 2007; Nekhili & 
Gatfaoui; 2013). This role is particularly crucial with regard to the issue of earnings management, 
in that one of the responsibilities of boards is to monitor management (Klein, 2002; Rahman & 
Ali, 2006; Xie, Davidson, & Dalton, 2003). More closely related to our particular focus, there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that women are strict monitors of management (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009) and that firms with gender-diverse boards are less likely to manage earnings 
(Arun et al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Labelle et al., 2010; Srinidhi 
et al., 2011). These arguments lead us to explore whether board gender diversity in France has a 
favourable effect with regard to earnings management.  
3. Background and hypothesis development 
3.1. Gender diversity and earnings management      
The issue of earnings quality involves monetary and ethical dilemmas, for which existing 
studies commonly consider gender to be a predicting factor (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008). Women 
and men have different capabilities because of differing socialisation processes (Srinidhi et al., 
2011). Betz, O’Connell, and Shepard (1989) addresss differences between men and women with 
regard to monetary and financial matters, and find that women emphasize assisting others, 
whereas men focus on making money and moving upwards in the organizational hierarchy. Most 
importantly, women are more ethical in their professional life and less likely than men to act in 
immoral ways for financial gain (Betz et al., 1989; Kaplan, Pany, Samuels, and Zhang, 2009). In 
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addition, Kaplan et al. (2009) suggest that women are more likely to report incidents of 
fraudulent financial reporting. 
Differences in gender characteristics have also been noted in decision-making and risk-
taking behavior. Prior studies reveal that women are less tolerant of opportunistic behavior when 
making organizational decisions (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008) and place less importance on 
personal interests, appropriateness and common practices. Further, they are more likely to be risk 
averse than men (Barber & Odean, 2001; Powell & Ansic, 1997). Women are more cautious and 
less aggressive than men in various decision-making contexts (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), 
and are less likely to take risks, especially in financial decision-making environments (Powell & 
Ansic, 1997). They also tend to act more decisively than men to enhance earnings quality because 
they are highly sensitive to reputational loss and the risk of lawsuits (Srinidhi et al., 2011). It is 
therefore generally considered that women will adopt a restrained approach towards earnings 
management (Gul, Fung, & Jaggi, 2009).    
Krishnan & Parsons (2008) find that firms with more women in their senior management 
report high quality earnings. The findings of Srinidhi et al. (2011), echoed by Gavious et al. 
(2012), also indicate the favourable impact of women directors on earnings quality. A recent 
study by Arun et al. (2015) shows that firms in the United Kingdom with a majority of female 
and independent female directors on their boards adopt restrained earnings management 
practices. However, findings of previous studies do not support this conclusion regarding the 
relationship between gender diversity and earnings management. For example, Sun, Liu, and Lan 
(2011) were unable to find any correlation between female participation on audit committees and 
earnings management. Similarly, Peni and Vahamma (2010) find no relationship between 
earnings management and the gender of the firm’s CEO. In view of the above findings, our first 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
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H1. Female directors constrain earnings management. 
3.2. Statutory diversity of the board and earnings management 
Statutory diversity is essential for effective monitoring of management to protect 
shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Statutory or fiduciary governance focuses on 
strongly recommended governance practices, for example, the presence of more independent 
directors on the board and separation of the CEO’s and chairperson’s roles. This is commonly 
known as leadership structure (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013). Similarly, audit committee independence 
is generally recognised as a “best practice” for corporate governance. Fiduciary governance is 
based on the idea that the board’s independence from management will improve the overseeing 
quality of the board, which will indirectly enhance the firm’s performance (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; John & Senbet, 1998). The literature on governance fully explores the propositions of 
agency theory and suggests that the board’s monitoring function is a key element of an 
organization’s governance system (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; John & Senbet, 
1998). In accordance with the premise of fiduciary governance, statutory diversity is likely to 
enhance the board’s effectiveness, which in turn improves the firm’s performance by reducing 
agency costs (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013). Recent studies provide evidence that statutory diversity 
measures play an active role in ensuring the quality of reported earnings (Arun et al., 2015; 
Gavious et al., 2012; Srinidhi et al., 2011). To measure the degree to which the board’s statutory 
diversity affects the relation between female directorship and earnings management, we consider 
three proxies of statutory diversity: women independent directors, audit committee members and 
women chairs. We further subdivide these variables into two groups based on the monitoring and 
leadership roles assigned to women directors. 
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3.2.1. Appointment of women to key monitoring positions and earnings management 
The ability of board to oversee management largely depends on key monitoring positions, 
such as independent directorships and audit committee membership (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Klein, 2002; Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002). The primary duty of the audit committee is to monitor 
the firm’s financial reporting process (Klein, 2002; Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002). Moreover, 
independent directors exhibit better monitoring skills, which in turn minimizes the likelihood of 
earnings management and financial fraud (Beasley, 1996; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2007). The audit committee and board independence are negatively related 
to earnings management, and boards organized to be more independent are highly effective at 
monitoring financial reporting process (Klein, 2002).  
Diverse boards may also monitor management more effectively, because board independence 
is associated with board diversity (Adams, Haan, & Terjesen, 2015). Ferreira (2015) argues that 
board independence is affected by the gender of directors. The literature provides evidence that 
gender-diverse boards are more likely to exhibit independent thinking and stronger monitoring 
ability (Adams & Ferreira, 2009: Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). As regards earnings 
quality, Bruns and Merchant (1990) emphasize that earnings management poses an ethical 
dilemma. In this respect, women tend to be better at dealing with ethical issues than men 
(Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Labelle et al., 2010). Empirical support for this proposition is 
provided by Srinidhi et al. (2011), who find a negative correlation between non-executive female 
directors and earnings management. In a more recent paper, Arun et al. (2015) argue that firms 
with a higher proportion of independent female directors tend to adopt restrained earnings 
management practices.  
With regard to board committees, Adams and Ferreira (2009) propose that female directors 
are more likely than male directors to sit on monitoring-related committees. In particular, women 
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are more likely to be found in audit committees. These authors find that the proportion of women 
on board committees is higher than that of women on boards. Few studies discuss the impact of 
audit committees’ gender diversity on earnings management, but the reported findings are 
inconsistent. For instance, Gavious et al. (2012) demonstrate that accounting aggressiveness 
(measured by earnings management) is associated with the proportion of women on audit 
committees. Firms that have at least one woman in their audit committees produce high quality 
earnings reports (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Conversely, Sun et al. (2011) find no evidence linking the 
presence of women on audit committees and earnings management. Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) 
disagree with the findings of Sun et al. (2011) and suggest that inclusion of female directors on 
audit committee restrains earnings management. On the basis of the above studies, we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
H2. The appointment of women directors to key monitoring positions is negatively associated 
with earnings management. 
3.2.2. Female board leadership and earnings management 
The board chair, alongside other directors, is the highest decision-making level in the 
organization. The prime duty of the chair is to run the board effectively by promoting the 
participation of all board members in monitoring the performance of executives and managing 
board dynamics (Machold, Huse, Minichilli, & Nordqvist, 2011). The chairperson is expected to 
lead the board by capturing the value of the diversity of opinions and maintaining coherence 
among board members in order to bring everyone around to shared organizational goals (Daily & 
Dalton, 1997; Machold et al., 2011). All important organizational decisions are made at board 
meetings, and the chairperson, as a leader for board members, can influence board meetings 
(Gabrielsson, Huse, & Minichilli, 2007). Along similar lines, McNulty, Pettigrew, Jobome, and 
Morris (2009) posit that board chairs use their role and position to influence organizational 
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decisions. By focusing on different types of board chairs, they conclude that executive chairs 
exert more influence on strategy (i.e. decisions about joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions) 
and resource dependence tasks (creation and distribution of financial, material and symbolic 
resources), whereas non-executive chairs have more influence over monitoring and control (i.e. 
hiring, firing and remuneration) of the CEO’s and other executives’ tasks.  
Given that earnings management is an ethical issue (Bruns & Merchant, 1990), the skills and 
behaviour of the board chair may be key factors with regard to earnings quality and the quality of 
financial statements in general. In this regard, the literature in psychology and management has 
shown that substantial gender differences exist in relation to conservatism, risk aversion, 
decision-making and leadership style (Kim & Shim, 2003; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010). With regard 
to leadership style, Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt, and Van Engen (2003) argue that women tend to 
follow a transformational and democratic or participative leadership style, whereas men are 
observed to adopt a transactional and autocratic leadership style. The transformational leadership 
style, which produces less incongruence between the leader role and the gender role (Eagly et al., 
2003), is clearly based on ethical, personal and social values to a much greater extent than the 
transactional leadership style (Hood, 2003). Furthermore, women tend to be less assertive, less 
overconfident, more legitimate, risk averse and highly ethical (Francis et al., 2015; Ho, Li, Tam, 
& Zhang, 2015). These characteristics are suggestive of a conservative mental approach, which is 
an essential principal of accounting (Francis et al., 2015; Ho et al., 2015), and less likelihood to 
be involved in fraud (Ho et al., 2015). Another argument is that women are less aggressive 
decision-makers than men (Francis et al., 2015; Ho et al., 2015; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010), and 
more concerned about their reputation. They are therefore inclined to adopt a restrained approach 
toward earnings management, because they want to avoid the risk of lawsuits and loss of 
reputation (Gul et al., 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2011). By focusing on women’s distinctive traits, such 
as accounting conservatisim, risk aversion, firm opposition to fraud, higher ethical standards, 
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reputational concerns (e.g. Francis et al., 2015; Ho et al., 2015; Peni & Vahama, 2010) and 
adoption of the transformational leadership style appropriate for the chairperson, we suggest that 
female leaders are more suited to the chair position with regard to the assessment of earnings 
management. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H3. Women chairs are likely to decrease the level of earnings management.  
3.3. Demographic diversity of corporate boards and earnings management 
Demographic diversity is likely to have a direct effect on the board’s decision-making ability 
by raising the level of directors’ skills and competencies (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013). From the 
standpoint of human capital theory, people’s demographic attributes (e.g. education, skills and 
experience) can enhance their cognitive and productive abilities, which benefits both the 
individual and his/her organization (Becker, 1964). As regards board membership, Kesner (1988) 
asserts that in order to be considered for directorships, individuals should have a wide range of 
human capital and demographic attributes. Similarly, in the French context, Nekhili and Gatfaoui 
(2013) suggest that women are hired by boards on the basis of their demographic characteristics. 
Therefore, boards tend to appoint women if they possess specific demographic attributes (e.g. 
behaviour, education background and experience) to a greater than men.  
The study by Labelle et al. (2010) argues that diversity other than required by the standards 
and codes of corporate governance is likely to be part of governance practices for the defence of 
stakeholders’ interests. Diversity that is not required by corporate governance standards is 
demographic in nature (education, business expertise and experience). Furthermore, Carter et al. 
(2003) contend that agency theory (statutory differences among board members) is not enough to 
guarantee a real relationship between board diversity and organizational performance. Statutory 
diversity has an effect, but it depends upon the individual characteristics or demographic 
attributes of board members (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013). In the context of this study, we also expect 
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a similar effect from the demographic diversity of female board members. Demographic diversity 
of female board members is likely to complement statutory diversity, which is expected to 
improve the monitoring function of the board for decreasing earnings management by managers. 
Studies on diversity mostly take into account the effect of one element of demographic diversity 
at a time (Ben‐Amar et al., 2013). Contrary to existing studies, we consider the effect of women’s 
education level, business expertise, nationality, tenure and multiple directorships. We further 
categorize these attributes into two groups on the basis of women directors’ educational expertise 
(education level and background) and experience (tenure, multiple directorships and nationality). 
3.3.1. Educational expertise of women directors and earnings management 
Individuals with and without business education tend to exhibit different decision-making 
styles (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). In a recent paper, Nekhili and 
Gatfaoui (2013) propose that women directors need to have business education and expertise to 
reach key positions (e.g. membership of various board committees) in the organization. 
Moreover, financial expertise of audit committee members is an important factor for ensuring the 
quality of reported earnings (Bédard & Gendron, 2010). However, irrespective of all other traits, 
business expertise (such as an MBA) can enhance an individual’s chances of success and 
appointment to the board in today’s complex business environment (Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 
2007).  
With regard to education level, Papadakis and Barwise (2002) suggest that highly educated 
individuals are able to make better decisions because of their cognitive ability to process and 
analyse available information. For managing boardroom diversity, it is important to consider 
directors’ qualifications (education level and background) (Ruigrok et al., 2007). Daily and 
Dalton (1994) point out that most women directors have a business education background. These 
studies provide evidence that irrespective of background (business or non-business); education 
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level can enhance an individual’s chances of success and appointment to a board of directors. We 
therefore anticipate that educational expertise
1
 of women directors will decrease the magnitude of 
earnings management. Hence, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H4. Educational expertise of women directors is likely to restrain earnings management.  
3.3.2. Experience of women directors and earnings management 
Experience and familiarity with business enhance the competencies of individuals’ 
contribution to the complex and highly sensitive proceedings of boards (Kesner, 1988). The 
experience and expertise of outside directors strengthen their advisory abilities and are likely to 
improve the quality of their strategic decision-making (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008; 
McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008). Most importantly, firms should hire and retain outside 
directors whose experience matches their strategic plans (McDonald et al., 2008). Various writers 
conclude that by acquiring experience, directors improve their advisory skills, which in turn will 
improve the decision-making ability of the board (Kroll et al., 2008; McDonald et al., 2008). In 
the context of this study, we consider three proxies of experience – tenure, multiple directorships 
and nationality of women directors – commonly used in the literature.  
Organizational demographic research shows that a director’s tenure has a strong impact on 
the firm’s performance (Kosnik, 1990). One study found that it takes directors three to five years 
to gain an adequate understanding of a firm and the way it operates (Bacon & Brown, 1973), and 
that a detailed understanding of the firm requires longer (Kesner, 1988). As regards financial 
reporting, Beasley (1996) argues that chances of financial statement fraud decrease as the tenure 
of outside directors increases. Similarly, Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) conclude that 
the level of earnings management (abnormal accruals) is inversely associated with the average 
tenure of outside committee members.  
                                                            
1 The term “educational expertise” is used interchangeably with the terms education level and background of women 
directors. 
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Holding multiple board seats enables directors to build a reputation as monitoring experts 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). The literature provides strong support for the positive reputation effect of 
multiple directorships – measured by the number of board seats held by independent directors – 
in several corporate governance scenarios (Vafeas, 1999). Multiple directorships can facilitate the 
exchange of information, and such information may be vital for organizations to find and assess 
evolving opportunities (Connelly & Van Slyke, 2012). Indeed, multiple directorships enhance the 
level of an individual’s understanding of the business environment and organizational issues, 
which in turn improves directors’ monitoring efficiency (Connelly & Van Slyke, 2012; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Vafeas, 1999). More recently, Shu, Yeh, Chiu, and Yang (2015) suggest that 
externally connected directors thereby gain financial expertise, which helps them to reduce the 
level of earnings management. 
In contrast with the above studies, another stream in the literature proposes that multiple 
directorships can be detrimental for organizations and results in weaker corporate governance, 
poor financial performance and lower market-to-book ratios (Cashman, Gillan, & Jun, 2012; Fich 
& Shivdasani, 2006). These effects might stem from inefficient monitoring of management by 
“over-boarded” directors, due to less time available for considering in detail the managerial 
issues of all the firms (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Furthermore, the probability of financial fraud 
increases in proportion to the average number of multiple board seats held by independent 
directors (Beasley, 1996). Finally, the contagion effect hypothesis suggests that earnings 
management is a virus that spreads from one organization to another through multiple 
directorships (Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 2013). According to the busyness hypothesis, contagion effect 
hypothesis, and the learning effect hypothesis, multiple directorships can be value detrimental or 
incremental for organizations.  
From the perspective of resource dependence theory, the cultural knowledge and know-how 
of foreign directors are valuable for firms in those directors’ domestic market (Ruigrok et al., 
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2007). Consistently with resource dependence theory, we consider foreign female directors as a 
proxy of international experience. In a previous study of foreign directors, Choi, Park, and Yoo 
(2007) reported the positive impact of foreign board members on firm performance. Similarly, 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) conclude that Norwegian and Swedish firms with foreign directors 
on their boards have higher valuations than their competitors without foreign independent 
directors. In the context of this study, foreign women directors are expected to have a positive 
impact on the quality of reported earnings. Taken together, these studies suggest that all proxies 
of experience – tenure, multiple directorships and nationality – enhance the monitoring ability of 
the board, which is likely to reduce the chances of earnings manipulation by managers. Hence, 
we propose the following hypothesis:  
H5. Women directors’ experience is negatively associated with earnings management. 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data selection 
Our initial sample comprises companies listed on the Euronext Paris CAC All-hares Index 
with a trading volume higher than 5% of their share capital, irrespective of market capitalization, 
during the period 2001-2010. The sample starts in 2001 due to the non-availability of governance 
data in earlier periods and ends in 2010, in order to consider female directors appointed on a 
totally voluntary basis.
2
 We exclude real estate, foreign, and financial firms from the initial 
sample due to their different regulations. After applying the data restrictions above, our final 
sample comprises 394 firms in the 2001-2010 period, for a total of 3160 unbalanced firm-year 
observations. Accounting and financial data were collected from Thomson Datastream. The 
                                                            
2 As highlighted by Singh, Point, Moulin, and Davila (2015), French companies had then only three years to comply 
with the 2011 quota legislation (i.e., from 2014, 20% of a firm’s board members must be women). As a result, the 
number of female directors started to grow considerably from 2011. In the view of these authors, this urgency leads 
to questions about the supply and legitimacy of the women who had been appointed in the period between the 
implementation in 2011 and the application of the quota law (20% from 2014 and 40% from 2016). 
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Thomson One database was utilised to collect information about ownership structure. Data 
regarding governance variables, women directors and their specific attributes were collected from 
annual reports and cross-checked with information available on www.whoswho.fr and 
www.dirigeant.societe.com.   
4.2. Measure of earnings management 
Prominent scholars suggest that managers use accruals mostly to manipulate earnings, 
because accruals are hard to detect by external stakeholders (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; 
Jones, 1991; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). Furthermore, earnings can be managed through 
short or long-term discretionary accruals (Arun et al., 2015). Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam (1998) suggest that managers have more discretion over short-term or current 
accruals than over long-term accruals. In this study, we gauge earnings management (i.e. current 
discretionary accruals) using the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995),
3
 which is widely 
used to measure current discretionary accruals (Arun et al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Park & 
Shin, 2004; Shu et al., 2015). Following Dechow et al. (1995), we estimate current accruals by 
using the cross-sectional regression equation below:
 4
 
              [       ]     [(              )       ]                  (1) 
where      are current accruals, measured as net income before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flow,       denotes total assets at the beginning of each year,          is the 
                                                            
3 Jones (1991) relates total accruals to the change in sales (      ) and gross property plant and equipment (PPP) 
as given below: 
             [       ]    (              )    (           ) 
Sales are subject to earnings management by managers (i.e. increasing the sales recognition by the end of year). By 
using the Jones Model, we remove the portion of discretionary accruals (Arun et al., 2015). Due to this limitation of 
the Jones Model, we follow the modified version of the Jones Model developed by Dechow et al., (1995). 
4 Consistently with the studies of Arun et al. (2015) and Park and Shin (2004), industry groups with fewer than six 
observations are excluded from the sample. 
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change in sales, and       is the change in trade receivables. The residual (   ) of the equation is 
current discretionary accruals (CDA). The subscripts i and t stand for firm and year. 
4.3. Control variables 
In our study, firm-specific characteristics that can influence the level of accruals and gender 
diversity are considered. Board size (B_SIZE) is the number of directors on a board. There is 
disagreement in the literature regarding the effect of board size on earnings management. Xie et 
al. (2003) find a negative correlation between board size and earnings management. Conversely, 
Rahman and Ali (2006) suggest a positive relationship between the two. Prior studies support the 
idea that board independence (B_IND) can reduce earnings management (Beasley, 1996; Klein, 
2002). Board meetings (B_MEET) represent the degree of board activity and are therefore 
expected to decrease the level of earnings management (Xie et al., 2003). Similarly to Ahn, 
Jiraporn, and Kim (2010), we control for CEO duality (DUAL) to measure CEO entrenchment. In 
line with the study by Gavious et al. (2012) a positive impact of CEO duality (DUAL) on 
earnings management is expected. Davidson, Xie, Xu, and Ning (2007) assert that CEOs who are 
approaching retirement age are more prone to manage earnings through accruals. In light of this 
finding, it is interesting to study the influence of CEO tenure (CEO_TEN) on earnings 
management. Family ownership (FAM_OWN) is the percentage of shares held by families. With 
regard to family ownership (FAM_OWN), Jaggi and Leung (2007) state that concentration of 
ownership in the hands of families is conducive to discouraging earnings management. Similarly, 
institutional ownership (INST_OWN) limits the management’s ability to manipulate earnings 
(Koh, 2003; Park & Shin, 2004). To control for audit quality, we use the variable “BIG” because 
the presence of a big audit firm is associated with higher earnings quality (Gavious et al., 2012). 
Leverage and loss are proxies for the firm’s financial condition. To date, empirical findings for 
the impact of leverage (LEV) on earnings management are inconclusive (Vasilescu & Millo, 
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2016). Several studies indicate that managers in financially distressed firms exert less discretion 
over accruals estimates (Arun et al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Srinidhi et al., 2011). 
Consequently, we expect a negative relationship between financial loss (LOSS) and earnings 
management. Tobin’s Q (TQ) is used as a proxy for the firm’s financial performance. Similarly to 
Shu et al. (2015), a negative relationship is expected between Tobin’s Q and earnings 
management. The research and development (R&D) intensity of firms may affect earnings 
management. With respect to operating cash flow (CASH), Gul et al. (2009) report that firms with 
a higher level of operating cash flows are less likely to engage in earnings manipulation. We 
consider foreign assets (FOR_ASSETS) of sample firms to account for the effect of foreign 
investment on the level of earnings management. Systematic risk is measured by BETA; firms at 
high risk will exert more discretion on earnings to reduce perceived risk. Following Labelle et al. 
(2010), we expect a positive association between market risk and earnings management. We also 
control for U.S. cross-listing (CROSS), following Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006), who find 
evidence of earnings management in cross-listed firms. Finally, firm size (F_SIZE), measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets, is expected to have a negative relationship with earnings 
management (Peni & Vähämaa, 2010; Shu et al., 2015). Given that the extent of earnings 
management may differ over time and by industry, we also add dummies to control for the 
possible effect of time and industry. Table 1 describes all variables considered in our study. 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
5. Data analysis and results 
5.1.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics for our sample firms. The average value of 
current discretionary accruals (CDA) measured by the Modified Jones Model (MJM) is 0.012, 
indicating that on average French firms are involved in income-increasing earnings management. 
20 
With regard to women directors (WDIR_BIN & WDIR_NB), we find that on average sample firms 
have fewer than one female director on their boards. On these boards, the mean percentage of 
women (WDIR_%) is 10.72, and 4.62% of chairpersons are female (WCHAIR). The mean of 
independent women directors (WIND) is 8.9%, and the proportion of women directors on audit 
committees (WACOM) is only 2.37%.  Note that 46.82% of women directors are highly educated 
(WEDUC) and that 45.82% come from a relevant business education background (WBUS). 
Approximately 9% of women directors are foreign nationals (WNAT). As for experience, the 
majority (61.6%) of women directors hold multiple directorships (WMUL), and the average 
tenure of women directors (WTEN) is 6.51 years. In our sample, the mean percentage of female 
CEOs (WCEO) and CFOs (WCFO) is 3.63% and 12.99% respectively. Panel A of Table 2 also 
provides descriptive statistics for control variables. Average boards (B_SIZE) have 7.7 directors. 
27.54% of whom are independent (B_IND). The average number of board meetings (B_MEET) is 
6.36 per year, and in 62.58% of the firm-years there is CEO/Chairperson duality (DUAL). The 
average tenure of chief executive officers (CEO_TEN) is 7.82 years. We also find that on average 
36.84% of shares are held by family owners and that institutional shareholding is 18%. These 
statistics reveal that families hold more shares than institutions. The median number of big 
auditors (BIG) is 1 across our sample firms. The mean of financial leverage (LEV) is 23.10% and 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) is slightly higher than unity (1.041). Almost 24% of firms report incidents of 
financial loss (LOSS) in their financial statements. The R&D intensity (R&D) is 1.81% on 
average and the mean of operating cash flow is 9.88%. Our sample firms invest 18.77% of their 
assets in foreign countries (FOR_ASSETS) and their systematic risk (BETA) is less than unity 
(0.658). Some 8.6% of the firms are cross-listed (CROSS) in the United States, and average firm 
size (F_SIZE) is 4.919 billion euros. These statistics are similar to those of prior studies 
conducted on French corporations (e.g. Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013). 
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Panel B of Table 2 presents the summary statistics regarding the proportion of women 
directors across our sample firm-years. These statistics show that in 1629 (51.53%) firm-years, 
our sample firms have no women on their boards. In 1053 (33.2%) firm-years, only one woman 
is present on these boards. In 357 (11.30%) firm-years, two female directors have been appointed 
to the board. These statistics reveal that fewer than half (48.47%) of our sample firms have 
gender-diverse boards. In addition, 33.32%, 11.30%, 2.56% and 1.27% of sample firm-years 
have 1, 2, 3 and 4 female directors on their boards, respectively. The majority (33.2%) of our 
sample’s gender-diverse firms have only one woman on their boards, and there are very few 
firms with more than one woman on the board. For these reasons, we consider three different 
measures of women directorship – a dummy variable, and the percentage and number of women 
directors – commonly used by researchers (Arun et al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Srinidhi et al., 
2011). 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 exhibits descriptive statistics by year for the percentage of women directors, the 
number of women directors, women directors’ attributes and the percentage of women in top 
executive positions (i.e., CEO and CFO). The results clearly indicate that while the percentage 
and the number of women directors increased significantly over the years, the number of women 
at top management levels (WCHAIR, WCEO and WCFO) did not. Nekhili, Chakroun, and 
Chtioui (2016) claim that this phenomenon is global and firms tend, almost everywhere in the 
world, to respond to pressure from different stakeholders by promoting gender diversity on 
boards. Nevertheless, the access of women to the highest levels of management continues to be 
extremely limited (Nekhili et al., 2016). For the other attributes evolved over time, we note the 
presence of more independent women directors on French boards. They are also more likely to 
have a business degree and more prone to access to the audit committee. Finally, they are on 
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average more experienced as captured by tenure. No significant changes are observed over the 
years for the rest of women directors’ attributes such as education, nationality and multi-
directorship. These trends may reflect a wider cultural shift in French companies towards board 
gender diversity as well as the attributes required for female directorship candidates. 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
5.2. Propensity score matching 
The possible effect of gender diversity may be due to firm-related factors that affect gender 
diversity and earnings management simultaneously. In this scenario, direct analysis of all firms is 
not appropriate due to differences in firm-level characteristics. To eliminate differences in firm-
specific factors, we use propensity score matching, as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We 
match gender-diverse firms (with one female director) in a meaningful way with a set of control 
firms (with all-male boards) having almost identical characteristics (the nearest predicted 
propensity score) to gender-diverse firms. Bad matching occurs if the nearest neighbour is 
distant. Using a calliper distance of 1% without replacement,
5
 we impose a restriction on the 
maximum propensity score (calliper) so as to reduce the probability of bad matching. Propensity 
score matching yields a matched sample consisting of 1894 cases: 947 treatment (firms with 
gender-diverse boards) and 947 control cases (firms with all-male boards). Table 4 shows that 
post-match pairwise differences of the control variables decrease in magnitude with respect to the 
pre-match sample and become statistically insignificant.  Comparing the results of the entire 
sample to those of the matched sample, we find no significant difference in firm-specific 
characteristics between gender-diverse and non-gender-diverse firms. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
                                                            
5 Matching without replacement means that the same gender-diverse firm can be matched to only one non-gender-
diverse firm. 
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In Table 5, we report the findings of the Pearson correlation analysis and variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for dependent, independent and control variables. The correlation among all 
variables is below 0.5 and variance inflation factors (VIF) are also less than the critical value of 
10, as suggested by (O’Brien, 2007). There is therefore no multicollinearity issue that might 
influence our results. 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
5.3. Principal component analysis (PCA) 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical tool used to summarise large amounts of 
data in comparatively few “components”, which specifies the maximum possible variation from 
the original variables, in order to make interpretations more understandable (Abdi & Williams, 
2010). The variance of each component is the eigenvalue of that particular component, while the 
component loadings matrix is the correlation among the original variables and derived 
components. Kaiser’s rule suggests retaining only those components with eigenvalues greater 
than unity. We can use PCA only if there is sufficient correlation between the original variables. 
A commonly used measure for sampling adequacy is Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO), which 
assumes values between 0 and 1. Low values are an indication of low correlation. A KMO value 
of higher than 0.5 is considered satisfactory to justify the use of PCA.  
Initially we included eight variables on the statutory and demographic attributes of women 
directors in our study. To make interpretations more meaningful, we chose to reduce the variables 
by means of PCA. We applied the KMO measure of sample adequacy to justify the use of PCA. 
The KMO test in PCA using eight original attributes shows that the KMO index is higher than 
0.5 (0.72), with significance equal to 0. We obtained eight components with calculated 
eigenvalues corresponding to eight original variables. However, only four components with 
eigenvalues more than unity were retained for further analysis.  
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Table 6 presents the four derived components with their “names” and loadings. These 
derived components are named after the variables with which they are highly correlated. The first 
component has the highest correlation (0.531) with business education (WBUS), meaning that the 
first component is explained by the variable business education. Therefore the first component is 
named “EXPERTISE.” The second component is named “LEADERSHIP” because it loads highly 
(0.671) on women chairpersons (WCHAIR), which is a proxy of leadership. Similarly, the third 
component ranks high on both proxies of experience: multiple directorships (0.622) and tenure of 
women directors (0.548). Accordingly, the third component is named “EXPERIENCE.” Finally, 
the fourth component loads heavily (0.660) on women directors’ audit committee membership, 
and is named committee membership (AUDCOM_MEMB). The remaining attributes that loaded 
on these components are given in Table 6. In total, these four retained components account for 
60.6% of the variance in the original attributes. Scholars suggest that a component analysis that 
explains 60% of the variance in the original variables is satisfactory (Carcello, Hermanson, & 
McGrath, 1992). For further analysis, these four components are used as endogenous variables in 
our model to investigate the effect of women directors and their specific attributes (statutory and 
demographic) on the extent of earnings management. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
5.4. Test of H1 
Our study considers that both gender diversity and earnings management are endogenous. In 
this scenario, the potential effect of gender diversity may be driven by certain firm-specific 
characteristics simultaneously affecting gender diversity and earnings management. This is the 
classical endogeneity effect. Following Blundell and Bond (1998), to control for the possible 
endogeneity effect, we use the two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation 
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approach to capture the relationship between gender diversity and earnings management. This 
method is commonly known as the system GMM.
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                                                                                      (2) 
where     is the error term and the subscripts   and   stand for industry and year respectively. 
Table 7 presents the results of the system GMM regression for the matched sample in order 
to examine whether there is a relation between women directorship (our proxy for gender 
diversity) and current discretionary accruals (our proxy for earnings management). Here the main 
variable of interest is women directorship. In Model 1, we consider the presence (or not) of at 
least one female director (WDIR_BIN), and in the two other Models (2 & 3), we consider the 
percentage of women directors to total directors (WDIR_ %) and the number of women directors 
(WDIR_NB) respectively.  
As proposed in hypothesis H1, results in Table 7 show a negative and significant relationship 
between women directorship and current discretionary accruals in all models. This result is in line 
with our expectation that firms with gender-diverse boards exhibit higher monitoring skills and 
decrease the level of earnings management (Arun et al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Krishnan & 
Parsons, 2008; Srinidhi et al., 2011) in order to protect minority shareholders from being abused 
through earnings management by managers and controlling shareholders. 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
  
                                                            
6 The standard GMM considers only the first difference of each variable in a regression, while the lagged levels of 
explanatory variables are used as instruments. Blundell and Bond (1998) introduce the levels equation into the 
estimation procedure to produce a system GMM of two equations involving both the levels equation itself and the 
first-differenced equation. 
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5.5. Test of H2 to H5 
Table 8 presents the results of three different models that predict the effect of women 
directorship and their specific (statutory and demographic) attributes on the extent of earnings 
management measured by current discretionary accruals. In Model 1, we study the relationship 
between specific (statutory and demographic) attributes of female directors and current 
discretionary accruals on firms that have at least one woman on their boards, using four 
components derived through PCA instead of the original variables. In Models 2 and 3, we 
investigate the impact of board gender diversity on the extent of earnings management by 
considering the combined effect of female directors and their specific (statutory and 
demographic) attributes. In these models, women directorship is measured as the percentage of 
women directors to total directors (WDIR_ %) and the number of women directors (WDIR_NB) 
respectively. 
                                                              
                                                                   
                                                                
                                                                    
                                                                           (3) 
where     is the error term and the subscripts   and   stand for industry and year respectively 
The key finding is that results of Models 2 and 3 provide evidence of a significant and 
positive link between women directorship (WDIR) and current discretionary accruals (CDA), our 
proxy of earnings management. These results show that the negative effect of women 
directorship on the extent of earnings management observed in Table 7 is not due solely to the 
presence of female directors on the board. In fact, the negative impact of women directorship on 
earnings management was due to their specific (statutory and demographic) attributes. The 
addition of specific attributes in regression models meaningfully changes the nature of the 
association between women directors and earnings management.  
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In accordance with H2, we find a negative relationship between audit committee membership 
(COM_MEMB) of women directors and the level of discretionary accruals. Prior studies also 
show that the appointment of women directors to audit committee can minimize incidents of 
earnings manipulation (Gavious et al., 2012; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). In 
line with these studies, our findings suggest that the presence of women on audit committee leads 
to successfully tackling the problem of earnings management. The positive linkage proposed by 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Carter et al. (2003) between gender diversity and monitoring 
ability of the board seems also to apply to audit committees. 
Regarding female leadership, we find that women chairs have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on current discretionary accruals. A possible reason for this is that the 
argument of greater board effectiveness in monitoring management in the financial reporting 
process as a result having a woman as the board chairperson does not hold. The authority of 
chairpersons is derived from the firm’s board of directors, in that they do not have discretion over 
the decision-making process and make decisions subject to the consent of the entire board of 
directors (Gabrielsson et al., 2007). Our results thus call into question the capacity of female 
chairpersons in obtaining the agreement of all board members to influence organizational 
decisions and to monitor the performance of executives. Hence, H3 is not supported by our 
results. 
Consistently with hypothesis H4, we find that women directors’ business education and 
expertise is an important attribute for curbing earnings management. The impact of business 
expertise on current discretionary accruals is negative and significant at the 1% level. Women 
directors with a business educational background and financial expertise are therefore more likely 
to reduce the tendency of managers to manipulate earnings. This result corroborates the findings 
of Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2013) that business expertise is the most important attribute of women 
directors. Finally, in line with prior studies (Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Park & Shin, 2004), we 
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show that business education and financial expertise of women directors is an important attribute 
for effective monitoring of earnings management.  
Contrary to hypothesis H5, our results show that experience has a positive effect on the 
magnitude of current discretionary accruals. This result is in accordance with the hypothesis of 
busyness and the contagion effect. In support of the busyness hypothesis, Ahn et al. (2010) and 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that multiple directorships reduce the monitoring quality of the 
board, because directors with multiple board seats have less time available to consider in detail 
the managerial issues of all firms (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). With reference to the hypothesized 
contagion effect, Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013) propose that earnings management is a virus that 
spreads from one organization to another through multiple directorships. With regard to tenure, 
Xie et al. (2003) also find that the tenure of independent directors and the level of current 
discretionary accruals are positively associated. We therefore reject hypothesis H5. 
With regard to control variables, we observe a dual relationship between board size (B_SIZE) 
and current discretionary accruals. Therefore no major conclusion can be drawn. In line with 
Klein (2002), we find that board independence (B_IND) is negatively associated with the level of 
discretionary accruals. The number of board meetings (B_MEET) has a negative impact on our 
proxy of earnings management. The number of board meetings indicates the degree of board 
activity and this is expected to reduce the magnitude of earnings management (Xie et al., 2003). 
In line with our expectations, CEO duality (DUAL) encourages the practice of earnings 
management (Gavious et al., 2012), whereas CEO tenure (CEO_TEN) is negatively associated 
with earnings management as measured by current discretionary accruals. This latter finding 
contradicts the study by Davidson et al. (2007) which asserts that CEOs near retirement are more 
likely to engage in earnings manipulation. As regards ownership structure, we find both family 
and institutional shareholdings have a negative effect on the level of earnings management. These 
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findings are in accordance with those of prior studies (Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Koh, 2003; Park & 
Shin, 2004). 
For the remaining control variables, we find that the choice of big auditing firms (BIG) 
increases the level of earnings management. In support of this finding, Francis and Wang (2008) 
state that earnings quality will be high for firms audited by the Big 4 auditors in regimes with 
strong investor protection. Given the greater sanctions in countries with strong minority 
protection, auditor incentives change and big auditing firms are more likely to enforce higher 
earnings quality as investor protection regimes become stronger. Similar to the findings of Arun 
et al. (2015), leverage (LEV) exerts a negative effect on the level of current discretionary 
accruals. The proxy of the firm’s financial performance, Tobin’s Q (TQ), is negatively linked to 
earnings management. The variable “loss” has a negative and highly significant correlation with 
the extent of earnings management as measured by CDA, showing that managers in less 
profitable firms are less likely to engage in earnings management (Srinidhi et al., 2011). The 
intensity of R&D (R&D) is positively related to current discretionary accruals, albeit insignificant 
in Model 1 and Model 2. In line with Gul et al. (2009), we find that the higher the level of 
operating cash flows (CASH), the lower the magnitude of earnings management. In accordance 
with Chin et al.(2009), we find that firms with offshore investments (FOR_ASSETS) exhibit 
higher level of earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals. In contrast to the 
study by Labelle et al. (2010), our results suggest that market risk measured by beta minimizes 
the chances of earnings manipulation. Like Lang et al. (2006), we find that cross-listed (CROSS) 
firms are more likely to manipulate earnings through current discretionary accruals. This result is 
consistent with the “avoiding” hypothesis put forward by Licht (2003), in which he posits that 
corporate governance is a second-order factor in the U.S. cross-listing decision and that foreign 
firms are more likely to avoid more stringent regulations. Our findings are mixed with regard to 
firm size. From one model to another, the impact of firm size on CDA varies considerably. 
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[Please insert Table 8 here] 
5.6. Supplementary analysis  
Due to the involvement of executives in the financial reporting process and accounting 
related decision-making, female top executives, specifically CEOs and CFOs, may also affect the 
degree of earnings management (Francis et al., 2015; Jiang, Petroni, & Wang, 2010). The main 
argument is that female CFOs/CEOs tend to be more conservative than men in their financial 
reporting, due to their risk-averse approach (Francis et al., 2015; Ho et al., 2015). As a robustness 
check, we add variables, i.e. female CEO and CFO, to the regression analysis to check whether 
our results are consistent when women hold executive (CEO & CFO) positions.
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where     is the error term and the subscripts   and   stand for industry and year respectively  
Table 9 presents the results of the supplementary analysis. In Model 1, we study the 
relationship between specific (statutory and demographic) attributes of female directors, female 
top executives (WCEO & WCFO) and current discretionary accruals on firms that appoint at 
least one woman to their boards, using the four components derived through PCA instead of the 
original variables. In Model 2 and 3, we investigate the impact of gender diversity on earnings 
management by considering the combined effect of female directors, their specific (statutory and 
demographic) attributes and female top executives (WCEO & WCFO). For all models in Table 9, 
the effects of female directors and their specific (statutory and demographic) attributes on 
earnings management hold after considering the influence of female executives (WCEO & 
                                                            
7 At this stage, it is very unusual to have both a woman CEO and a woman Chair in the same firm (0.61% of cases). 
Consequently, we do not consider this scenario to be very plausible. 
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WCFO). With regard to female top executives, female CEOs have a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with earnings management, albeit very small in Model 2 and Model 3. 
This result is at odds with the findings of Peni and Vähämaa (2010), who find that female CEOs 
do not influence earnings management, and is in line with studies by Gavious et al. (2012) and 
Ho et al. (2015). In particular, in all models of Table 9, we find that female CFOs are negatively 
associated with the extent of earnings management. These findings provide evidence that female 
CFOs are more able to influence the level of earnings management than female CEOs. Our 
results confirm the previous findings by Gavious et al. (2012) and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) and 
are consistent with the argument that female CFOs are more risk averse and adopt conservative 
financial reporting strategies (Francis et al., 2015). 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 This study extends the literature on the linkage between board gender diversity and earnings 
management, by considering specific (statutory and demographic) attributes of women directors. 
Aligned with the notion of the agency theory, statutory diversity indirectly enhances the board’s 
effectiveness in creating value for shareholders by reducing agency cost (Dalton et al., 1998; 
John & Senbet, 1998). In our case, statutory diversity is also expected to create value by 
minimizing the likelihood of earnings manipulation by managers. Further, Carter et al. (2003) 
argue that agency theory (statutory differences of board members) is not enough to demonstrate 
an actual relationship between board diversity and organizational performance. In this regard, 
human capital theory states that an individual’s demographic attributes (e.g. experience and 
education level) can enhance cognitive and productive abilities, which benefit the both individual 
and the organization (Becker et al., 1998). Furthermore, Ben‐Amar et al. (2013) propose that the 
effect of statutory diversity is subject to individual characteristics and demographic attributes of 
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board members. Our study contributes to the literature by providing new insights into the channel 
(i.e. statutory and demographic attributes) through which female directors impact the extent of 
earnings management. 
We apply the system GMM estimation approach to a matched sample of 394 French firms 
listed on Euronext Paris during the period 2001-2010 in order to investigate the nature of the 
relationship between female directors and earnings management by considering the role of 
statutory and demographic attributes. Consistent with prior studies, our initial findings confirm 
the existence of a negative link between female directorships and earnings management (Arun et 
al., 2015; Gavious et al., 2012; Srinidhi et al., 2011). However, when we add specific attributes in 
regression models, results provide evidence of a positive relationship between female directors 
and earnings management. Our results show that specific (statutory and demographic) attributes 
of women directors count more for the effective monitoring of earnings management than simply 
the presence and/or the percentage of women on the board. In particular, our findings underline 
that business expertise and audit committee memberships are key attributes of women directors 
for the detection and correction of earnings management practices. With regard to these findings, 
prior studies show that financial expertise and the appointment of female directors to audit 
committees minimize the probability of earnings management (Bédard & Gendron, 2010; 
Srinidhi et al., 2011; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). In contrast, women’s chair leadership and 
experience are positively associated with the degree of earnings management. In accordance with 
the busyness and the contagion effect hypotheses, multiple directorships undermine the 
monitoring function of companies’ board and financial outcomes (Ahn et al., 2010; Cashman et 
al., 2012; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Further, the contagion effect 
proposes that earnings management is a virus that spreads from one organization to another 
through multiple directorships (Chiu et al., 2013). Finally, consistently with the findings of 
Francis et al. (2015) and Gavious et al. (2012), our supplementary analysis provides evidence to 
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suggest that female executives (WCEO & WCFO) are less likely to be associated with earnings 
management, with a more pronounced effect for female CFOs than for female CEOs.   
Our results complement existing academic research and have important implications for 
managers and regulators with regard to female directorship. First, our results extend previous 
work and provide deep insights into the relation between board gender diversity and earnings 
management, by explaining the channel through which female directors affect the magnitude of 
earnings management. In this regard, an important implication of our findings is that the decision 
to appoint women to corporate boards should be based on specific criteria (e.g. business expertise 
and monitoring skills) rather than blind implementation of gender quotas. Studying the impact of 
quotas without considering the attributes of female directors may then lead to inconclusive 
results. Second, in the light of our results regarding the impact of women at CEO and CFO 
positions on the extent of earnings management, we can question whether the mandatory quota of 
40% (from 2016) for women on corporate boards is a step forward in reducing gender gaps in top 
executive positions.  
While our results offer a new perspective about the effectiveness of board gender diversity 
by exploring the effect of female directors’ specific attributes on earnings management, we 
recognize at least two limitations to our study, which in turn suggest directions for future 
research. First, our study uses only current discretionary accruals to measure earnings 
management. In this regard, it will be interesting to test the association among female directors, 
their specific attributes and other proxies of earnings management (e.g. earnings smoothing or 
loss avoidance). Second, different measures women directors’ attributes should be considered to 
better understand the influence of women directors’ attributes on earnings management. For 
instance, we measure multiple directorships or busyness as the percentage of women directors 
serving on more than one board of directors simultaneously rather than the number of boards in 
which they are members. By doing so, we rule out the possibility to see whether the level of 
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busyness affects the magnitude of earnings management or not. This would be then interesting to 
classify women holding multiple directorships into quartiles based on the number of boards on 
which each serves by considering, for example, women directors in the top quartile as “super-
busy.” Third, our study deals only with board gender diversity by capturing the influence of 
female directors’ attributes. Accordingly, one should examine the influence of female executives’ 
(CEOs and CFOs) attributes on earnings management in order to show which of their specific 
attributes promote more effectively the monitoring of earnings management. Another argument is 
that some of CFOs eventually become CEOs. By taking the similar line of research further, 
scholars should answer an important research questions. Is there any specific attributes of women 
CFOs that lead them to become CEOs and if the promotion from CFOs to CEOs moderates 
managers’ tendency to engage in earnings management? Finally, this study considers the 
appointment of female directors on a voluntary rather than mandatory basis. Therefore, with 
regard to earnings quality, we suggest investigating the impact of female directors’ appointment 
on a mandatory basis and the possible changes in their specific attributes after implementation of 
gender quotas (20% from 2014 and 40% from 2016).  
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Table 1 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition Measure
8 
Dependent variables: 
 CDA Current discretionary accruals Current discretionary accruals calculated by using modified 
Jones model. 
Endogenous variables: 
WDIR_NB Number of women directors Total number of women directors. 
WDIR (%) Percentage of women directors Percentage of women directors to total directors. 
WDIR_BIN Women on board 
 
Dummy variable coded 1 if firm has one woman on board and 0 
otherwise. 
WCHAIR Woman chair Dummy variable coded 1 if chair is a woman and 0 otherwise. 
WIND Independent women directors Percentage of non-executive independent women directors to 
total women directors. 
WAUDCOM Audit committee memberships 
held by women directors 
Percentage of women directors who are members of one of the 
relevant operating committees to total women directors. 
WEDUC Education level of women 
directors 
Percentage of women with a Master’s degree or doctorate (PhD) 
to total women directors. 
WBUS Business education of women 
directors  
Percentage of women with formal education, specializing in 
business, to total women directors. 
WNAT Nationality of women directors Percentage of foreign women directors to total women directors. 
WMUL Multiple directorships held by 
women directors 
Percentage of women directors who are members of another 
firm’s board to total women directors. 
WTEN  Tenure of women directors Average number of years that women directors have been on the 
board. 
WCEO Women CEO Dummy variable coded 1 if CEO is a woman and 0 otherwise. 
WCFO Women CFO Dummy variable coded 1 if CFO is a woman and 0 otherwise. 
Exogenous variables: 
B_SIZE Board size Natural logarithm of the total number of directors. 
B_IND Board independence Ratio of non–executive independent directors to total number of 
directors. 
B_MEET Board meetings Natural logarithm of number of annual board meetings. 
DUAL CEO duality Dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is board chair and 0 
otherwise. 
CEO_TEN CEO tenure No. of years worked at company before selection as CEO. 
FAM_OWN Family ownership Percentage of capital held by family investors. 
INST_OWN Institutional ownership Percentage of capital held by institutional investors. 
BIG Audit by big auditor Ordinal variable coded 0 if company is audited by two non–big 
auditors, 1 if one auditor is big, and 2 if both auditors are big. 
LEV Leverage Ratio of financial debt to total assets. 
TQ Tobin’s Q Book value of assets minus book value of equity, plus the 
market value of equity, scaled by the book value of assets. 
LOSS Financial loss Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm reports loss and 0 otherwise. 
R&D Research and Development Ratio of investment in R&D to total assets. 
CASH Operating cash–flow Cash-flow from operations, scaled by total assets. 
FOR_ASSETS Foreign assets Ratio of foreign assets to total assets. 
BETA Market risk Equity beta. 
CROSS Cross listing in U.S. markets Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on one of the 
U.S. markets (direct listing or through ADRs), and 0 otherwise. 
F_SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
Industry Industry A binary variable coded 1 if the company belongs to the sector 
in question and 0 otherwise. 
 
                                                            
8 Variables from ThomsonOne are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for entire sample 
    Mean Median    Standard 
    Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CDA 0.012 0.021 0.103 –0.473 0.337 
WDIR_BIN 0.48 0 0.50 0 1 
WDIR (%) 10.72% 0 15.06% 0 75% 
WDIR_NB 0.688 0 0.865 0 4 
WCHAIR 4.62% 0 20.99% 0 1 
WIND 8.90% 0 26.55% 0 1 
WAUDCOM 2.37% 0 9.64% 0 90.2% 
WEDUC 46.82% 50% 46.26% 0 1 
WBUS 45.48% 33.33% 46.67% 0 1 
WNAT 9.37% 0 27.46% 0 1 
WMUL 61.60% 1 45.42% 0 1 
WTEN 6.51 5 6.32 0 42 
WCEO 3.63% 0 18.70% 0 1 
WCFO 12.99% 0 33.62% 0 1 
B_SIZE (No. of directors) 7.70 7 3.86 4 26 
B_IND 27.54% 25.5% 25.40% 0 1 
B_MEET (No. of meetings) 6.36 6 3.39 0 30 
DUAL 62.58% 1 48.40% 0 1 
CEO_TEN (No. of years) 7.82 6 6.193 0 42 
FAM_OWN 36.84% 39% 27.65% 0 99.37% 
INST_OWN 17.93% 4.44% 26.47% 0 98.63% 
BIG 0.922 1 0.659 0 2 
LEV 23.10% 21.47% 16.85% 0 74.45% 
TQ 1.041 0.807 0.830 0.197 5.38 
LOSS 24.17% 0 42.82% 0 1 
R&D 1.81% 0 7.55% 0 57.22% 
CASH 9.88% 7.26% 10.02% –7.47% 52.80% 
FOR_ASSETS 18.77% 3.67% 25.46% 0 91.87% 
BETA 0.658 0.642 0.289 0.132 1.508 
CROSS 8.60% 0 28.03% 0 1 
F_SIZE (in billions of euros) 4.919 0.225 16.992 0.001 240.560 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
Panel B: Proportion of women in sample firms 
Number of women directors Number of observations Percentage of observations 
0 1629 51.55 
1 1053 33.32 
2 357 11.30 
3 81   2.56 
4 40   1.27 
Total 3160  100 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics by year for the percentage of women directors, the number of women directors, women directors’ attributes and women in 
top executive positions 
Year WDIR 
(%) 
WDIR_NB 
(number) 
WCHAIR 
(%) 
WIND 
(%) 
WAUDCOM 
(%) 
WEDUC 
(%) 
WBUS 
(%) 
WNAT 
(%) 
WMUL 
(%) 
WTEN 
(number) 
WCEO 
(%) 
WCFO 
(%) 
2001 8.24 0.50 3.55 5.43 0.89 42.78 34.89 7.89 57.14 5.17 2.54 13.28 
2002 9.35 0.55 4.06 5.79 1.25 44.21 36.83 7.89 58.52 5.47 3.04 13.79 
2003 9.88 0.59 3.81 6.09 1.55 43.32 39.89 9.22 61.58 5.89 3.04 14.28 
2004 10.29 0.63 3.55 6.22 2.29 45.94 40.53 9.41 60.93 6.12 3.04 13.40 
2005 10.29 0.66 4.31 7.01 2.31 46.85 44.00 9.30 59.75 6.13 3.30 12.57 
2006 11.03 0.69 5.08 7.84 2.56 48.06 45.90 9.32 62.74 6.38 3.81 12.71 
2007 11.29 0.72 5.33 9.28 2.45 47.81 46.95 9.41 62.33 6.73 4.31 12.04 
2008 11.34 0.75 5.58 9.45 2.67 47.80 48.88 8.99 64.10 7.15 4.57 12.56 
2009 11.66 0.78 5.58 11.48 3.11 48.86 50.90 10.10 63.60 7.50 4.31 13.05 
2010 12.61 0.88 5.33 14.98 3.71 48.43 53.91 10.78 61.69 7.16 4.31 12.79 
Total 10.72 0.69 4.62 8.90 2.37 46.82 45.48 9.38 61.59 6.51 3.63 12.99 
F-valuea  
(p-value) 
2.29** 
(0.014) 
5.90***  
(0.000) 
0.64 
(0.766) 
2.47**  
(0.008) 
2.50**  
(0.007) 
0.35 
(0.959) 
2.89*** 
(0.002) 
0.17 
(0.997) 
0.35 
(0.957) 
2.35** 
(0.012) 
0.58 
(0.814) 
0.12 
(0.999) 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
a Analysis of variance F-value for mean difference test. 
**, *** represent significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Mean difference test between gender-diverse firms and non-gender-diverse firms for the entire 
sample and the matched sample 
Variables 
 
Entire Sample Matched Sample 
   Gender-
diverse  
  Firms 
All-male  
 firms 
 t-value    Gender-
diverse 
firms   
All-male 
firms 
t-value 
B_SIZE (No. of directors) 8.107 7.326 4.07***a 7.747 7.651 –1.03 a 
B_IND 0.303 0.273 2.96*** 0.297 0.292 0.42 
B_MEET (No. of meetings) 6.453 6.268 3.85***a 6.337 6.538 –0.06 a 
DUAL 0.662 0.588 3.94*** 0.630 0.627 0.10 
CEO_TEN (No of years) 8.632 7.097 6.33***a 8.227 8.108 0.11a 
FAM_OWN 0.364 0.360 0.35 0.360 0.348 0.91 
INST_OWN 0.180 0.191 –1.12 0.188 0.191 –0.25 
BIG 1.013 0.913 3.87*** 0.952 0.967 –0.50 
LEV 0.230 0.231 –0.37 0.226 0.224 0.27 
TQ 0.997 1.025 –0.91 1.022 1.016 0.15 
LOSS 0.208 0.267 –3.51*** 0.240 0.236 0.22 
R&D 0.014 0.012 0.78 0.012 0.012 0.15 
CASH 0.098 0.096 0.46 0.097 0.097 0.04 
FOR_ASSETS 0.195 0.210 –1.37 0.198 0.203 –0.38 
BETA 0.711 0.673 3.40*** 0.680 0.690 –0.83 
CROSS 0.104 0.079 2.26** 0.082 0.088 –0.49 
F_SIZE (in millions of euros) 7.208 3.019 3.71*** a 5.659 4.763 –0.33a 
Number of observations 1355 1355  947 947  
 **, *** represent significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
a
 t–tests are based on natural logarithm transformed values. 
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Table 5 
Pairwise correlation matrix 
* represent significance at 0.01 level. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 1 2 3 4       5 6        7 8 9 10 11 VIF 
1. CDA 1.000            –––– 
2. LCDA 0.007 1.000           –––– 
3. WDIR_BIN 0.013 0.013 1.000          1.03 
4. WDIR (%) 0.013 0.009 0.733* 1.000         1.95 
5. WDIR_NB 0.013 0.011 0.820* 0.819* 1.000        1.12 
6. WIND –0.007 –0.016 –0.037 –0.156* –0.011 1.000       1.23 
7. WAUDCOM 0.007 0.003 0.245* 0.155* 0.231* 0.105* 1.000      1.16 
8. WCHAIR 0.008 0.005 0.188* 0.198* 0.194* 0.016 –0.041  1.000     1.16 
9. WEDUC 0.024 0.005 0.013 –0.031 –0.050 0.108* –0.013  –0.041 1.000     1.16 
10. WBUS –0.009 –0.012 0.011 –0.127* –0.035 0.245* 0.175* –0.070* 0.200* 1.000   1.33 
11. WNAT  0.011 0.006 0.015 –0.133* –0.059 0.088* 0.047  –0.090* 0.070* 0.089* 1.000  1.28 
12. WMUL 0.004 0.005 0.058 –0.172* –0.076* 0.107* 0.124* 0.031 0.135* 0.183* 0.187* 1.28 
13. WTEN 0.015 0.009 0.091* 0.101* 0.028 –0.089* –0.051  0.006 –0.093* –0.182* –0.113* 1.27 
14. WCEO 0.001 –0.002 0.176* 0.209* 0.143* –0.022 –0.051* 0.112* –0.029 –0.029 –0.018 1.19 
15. WCFO –0.002 –0.001 0.115* 0.154* 0.110* –0.038 –0.001  –0.032 –0.001 0.117* –0.050 1.16 
16. B_SIZE  0.003 0.020 0.077* –0.268* 0.120* 0.221* 0.115* 0.020 –0.016 0.164* 0.165* 2.16 
17. B_IND –0.002 0.016 0.050* –0.120* 0.010 0.176* 0.147* 0.099* –0.005 0.101* 0.206* 1.54 
18. B_MEET  –0.045* –0.032 0.058* –0.012 0.056* 0.055 0.063* –0.053* 0.027 0.114* 0.120* 1.28 
19. DUAL –0.015 –0.017 0.029 0.009 –0.029 0.080* –0.040  –0.099* 0.036 –0.037 0.023 1.22 
20. CEO_TEN –0.007 –0.009 0.111* 0.079* 0.126* 0.128* 0.098* –0.064* –0.118* 0.052 0.055 1.36 
21. FAM_OWN 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.145* 0.045 –0.203* –0.073* 0.001 –0.100* –0.216* –0.108* 2.05 
22. INST_OWN –0.023 –0.017 –0.029 –0.058* –0.057* 0.048 –0.028  0.001 0.121* 0.065* 0.006 1.96 
23. BIG 0.015 0.020 0.067* –0.114* 0.054* 0.100* 0.127* –0.040 –0.029 0.140* 0.161* 1.60 
24. LEV 0.009 0.006 –0.009 –0.078* –0.026 0.006 0.080* –0.064* 0.010 0.074* 0.030 1.24 
25. TQ –0.021 –0.004 –0.011 0.008 –0.014 0.040 0.015  –0.033 –0.055 –0.062 –0.051 1.18 
26. LOSS –0.096* –0.025 –0.080* –0.030 –0.089* –0.040 –0.067* –0.039 0.021 0.004 0.008 1.16 
27. R&D –0.002 –0.001 0.033 –0.012 –0.004 0.020 –0.014  0.042 0.011 –0.098* 0.017 1.15 
28. CASH 0.003 0.010 –0.015 –0.019 –0.022 0.001 –0.011  0.001 –0.052 –0.016 –0.014 1.16 
29. FOR_ASSETS –0.040 –0.040 –0.037 –0.151* –0.045* 0.154* 0.080* –0.040 0.031 0.099* 0.312* 1.47 
30. BETA –0.006 –0.015 0.062* –0.072* 0.051* 0.203* 0.090* –0.012 –0.012 0.122* 0.176* 1.79 
31. CROSS 0.002 0.001 0.043 –0.084* 0.027 0.047 0.080* –0.013 0.020 0.147* 0.218* 1.33 
32. F_SIZE 0.020 0.015 0.078* –0.167* 0.075* 0.214* 0.121* 0.006 –0.053 0.141* 0.235* 2.96 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* represent significance at 0.01 level. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1
 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12. WMUL 1.000            
13. WTEN 0.000 1.000           
14. WCEO –0.058 0.077* 1.000          
15. WCFO 0.024 0.044 0.075* 1.000         
16. B_SIZE  0.206* –0.136* –0.099* –0.144* 1.000        
17. B_IND 0.050 –0.031 –0.072* –0.032 0.365* 1.000       
18. B_MEET  –0.079* –0.033 0.036  –0.018 0.137* 0.115* 1.000      
19. DUAL 0.078* 0.058 0.036  0.082* –0.079* –0.156* 0.021 1.000     
20. CEO_TEN 0.037 0.250* 0.034  –0.001 0.111* 0.098* 0.045* 0.118* 1.000    
21. FAM_OWN –0.126* 0.154* 0.148* 0.104* –0.220* –0.189* –0.104* –0.014 0.052* 1.000   
22. INST_OWN 0.158* –0.170* –0.077* –0.066* 0.025 0.011 –0.058* 0.102* –0.087* –0.537* 1.000  
23. BIG 0.139* –0.059 –0.126* –0.039 0.480* 0.309* 0.112* –0.076* 0.073* –0.140* 0.042 
24. LEV 0.118* –0.063 –0.019  –0.084* 0.154* 0.025 0.088* –0.009 0.019 –0.058* 0.055* 
25. TQ –0.050 –0.001 0.012  0.011 –0.062* –0.040 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.028  –0.065* 
26. LOSS –0.008 –0.022 –0.019  –0.020 –0.149* –0.085* 0.032 0.015 –0.074* –0.026  0.010 
27. R&D –0.022 0.095* 0.016  –0.023 0.032 0.062* 0.045 0.028 0.021 0.025  –0.069* 
28. CASH –0.041 0.051 0.008  0.006 –0.053* 0.095* 0.083* 0.030 0.045 –0.001  –0.091* 
29. FOR_ASSETS 0.113* –0.025 –0.076* –0.080* 0.336* 0.270* 0.157* –0.021 0.137* –0.198* 0.027 
30. BETA 0.091* 0.018 –0.017  –0.055* 0.266* 0.229* 0.240* –0.045* 0.095* –0.234* –0.081* 
31. CROSS 0.089* –0.076* –0.063* –0.092* 0.307* 0.202* 0.138* –0.033 –0.002 –0.148* –0.051* 
32. F_SIZE  0.170* –0.012 –0.071* –0.117* 0.547* 0.424* 0.230* –0.169* 0.137* –0.106* –0.277* 
 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
23. BIG 1.000           
24. LEV 0.045 1.000          
25. TQ 0.023 –0.168* 1.000         
26. LOSS –0.046* 0.040 –0.074* 1.000        
27. R&D 0.058* –0.051* 0.125* 0.018 1.000       
28. CASH 0.070* –0.269* 0.208* 0.014 0.205* 1.000      
29. FOR_ASSETS 0.310* 0.071* –0.028 –0.048* 0.051* –0.009  1.000     
30. BETA 0.284* –0.025 0.130* 0.081* 0.074* 0.150* 0.302* 1.000    
31. CROSS 0.203* 0.054* 0.035 0.028 0.061* 0.050* 0.177* 0.278* 1.000   
32. F_SIZE  0.412* 0.166* 0.016 –0.155* 0.054* 0.068* 0.376* 0.444* 0.337* 1.000 
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Table 6 
Derived components 
Variables Eigenvalue Description
 
Component 1: EXPERTISE (21.7%) 1.736  
  WCHAIR (–0.150) 
  WIND (0.399) 
  WAUDCOM (0.302) 
  WEDUC (0.334) 
  WBUS (0.531) 
  WNAT (0.320) 
  WMUL (0.370) 
  WTEN (–0.306) 
Component 2: LEADERSHIP (13.2%) 1.060  
  WCHAIR (0.671) 
  WIND (0.344) 
  WAUDCOM (–0.378) 
  WEDUC (0.174) 
  WBUS (0.181) 
  WNAT (–0.323) 
  WMUL (–0.174) 
  WTEN (–0.297) 
Component 3: EXPERIENCE (13%) 1.041  
  WCHAIR (0.503) 
  WIND (0.115) 
  WAUDCOM (0.076) 
  WEDUC (–0.140) 
  WBUS (–0.087) 
  WNAT (0.114) 
  WMULTI (0.622) 
  WTEN (0.548) 
Component 4: AUDCOM_MEMB (12.7%) 1.015  
  WCHAIR (0.070) 
  WIND (0.243) 
  WAUDCOM (0.660) 
  WEDUC (–0.416) 
  WBUS (0.163) 
  WNAT (–0.437) 
  WMULTI (–0.187) 
  WTEN (–0.006) 
 
Note: The first number in parentheses after the factor label is the variance accounted for by the component. The 
numbers in parentheses after the original variables explanation are the component loadings. The extraction method is 
principal component analysis and the factor loading coefficient cut-off is 0.50.  
All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 7 
System GMM regression of earnings management on women directorship 
Variables  
 
   Model 1     Model 2 Model 3 
    Coef.       t–test    Coef. t–test    Coef.   t–test 
Lag CDA –0.009*** –5.57 –0.001*** –5.72 –0.011*** –8.37 
WDIR_BIN –0.118*** –7.89     
WDIR (%)   –0.561*** –11.16   
WDIR_NB     –0.044*** –5.91 
B_SIZE  –0.020** –2.08 –0.070*** –6.69 –0.006 –0.74 
B_IND –0.058*** –3.67 –0.060*** –3.61 –0.055*** –4.38 
B_MEET  –0.042*** –5.91 –0.042*** –6.03 –0.036*** –6.06 
DUAL 0.003 0.37 –0.011 –1.39 –0.010 –1.56 
CEO_TEN –0.037*** –5.15 –0.018*** –2.87 –0.030*** –5.13 
FAM_OWN 0.010 0.88 0.007 0.44 –0.002 –0.20 
INST_OWN 0.008 0.46 –0.018 –1.11 –0.018 –1.34 
BIG 0.011 1.46 0.016** 2.37 0.010 1.74 
LEV –0.077*** –6.35 –0.073*** –6.34 –0.082*** –7.79 
TQ –0.007 –1.75 –0.008** –2.28 –0.008*** –2.70 
LOSS –0.121*** –24.37 –0.130*** –26.57 –0.120*** –27.41 
R&D –0.213*** –3.11 –0.207*** –3.70 –0.228*** –4.28 
CASH –0.197*** –6.83 –0.233*** –7.92 –0.214*** –8.20 
FOR_ASSETS 0.026 1.44 0.007 0.05 0.005 0.36 
BETA 0.005 0.35 0.015 1.14 0.016 1.46 
CROSS 0.030 1.86 0.024 1.73 0.024 1.90 
F_SIZE 0.002 1.81 0.008 0.55 0.001 1.49 
Intercept 0.311*** 7.49 0.410*** 10.08 0.260*** 7.98 
Industry (?) Yes Yes Yes 
Years (?) Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1751 1751 1751 
F (Prob > F) 7015.63 (p = 0.000) 8718.96 (p = 0.004) 6568.28 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –2.87 (p = 0.004) –2.91 (p = 0.000) –2.83 (p = 0.005) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): –1.01 (p = 0.314) –0.97 (p = 0.335) –1.05(p = 0.296) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 2960.80(p = 0.000) 2964.18 (p = 0.000) 2999.78 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 165.82 (p = 0.271) 167.09 (p = 0.231) 169.06 (p = 0.332) 
 **, *** represent significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1
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Table 8 
System GMM regression of earnings management on women directorship and attributes derived 
from PCA 
Variables  
 
   Model 1     Model 2 Model 3 
    Coef.       t–test    Coef. t–test    Coef.   t–test 
Lag CDA 0.070*** 27.38 0.085*** 13.11 0.082*** 12.96 
WDIR (%)   0.366*** 21.90   
WDIR_NB     0.054*** 20.04 
AUDCOM_MEMB –0.010*** –10.47 –0.016*** –10.11 –0.013*** –6.37 
LEADERSHIP 0.016*** 14.41 0.025*** 15.87 0.024*** 13.47 
EXPERTISE –0.004*** –4.74 –0.009*** –7.43 –0.006*** –3.74 
EXPERIENCE 0.029*** 19.20 0.020*** 12.05 0.017*** 11.83 
B_SIZE  –0.016*** –5.04 0.042*** 8.11 –0.033*** –7.71 
B_IND –0.030*** –6.84 –0.015*** –2.61 –0.004   –0.87 
B_MEET  0.002 1.50 –0.006** –2.20 –0.005 –1.63 
DUAL 0.008*** 3.35 0.019*** 6.82 0.019*** 6.83 
CEO_TEN –0.004** –2.27 –0.002 –0.77 –0.004 –1.50 
FAM_OWN –0.078*** –19.70 –0.082*** –11.03 –0.065*** –8.35 
INST_OWN –0.056*** –10.28 –0.061*** –9.75 –0.050*** –9.71 
BIG 0.012*** 7.18 0.007*** 2.72 0.008*** 3.56 
LEV –0.040*** –5.82 –0.012 –1.38 –0.015 –1.55 
TQ –0.002*** –4.34 0.001 0.56 0.002 1.59 
LOSS –0.102*** –54.28 –0.098*** –41.13 –0.098*** –38.49 
R&D 0.060 1.72 0.060 1.31 0.111** 2.25 
CASH –0.168*** –13.20 –0.143*** –7.99 –0.141*** –9.29 
FOR_ASSETS 0.008** 2.00 0.016*** 2.63 0.028*** 5.45 
BETA –0.027*** –9.67 –0.015*** –3.30 –0.016*** –3.63 
CROSS 0.050*** 17.35 0.040*** 7.81 0.037*** 7.57 
F_SIZE –0.001*** –3.37 0.001** 2.30 0.000 0.97 
Intercept 0.070*** 5.22 –0.160*** –6.90 –0.009*** –0.50 
Industry (?) Yes Yes Yes 
Years (?) Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 886     886 886 
F (Prob > F) 10321.53 (p = 0.000) 88858.18 (p = 0.000) 60070.59 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –3.33 (p = 0.001) –3.67 (p = 0.000) –3.56 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): 0.08 (p = 0.934) –0.19 (p = 0.849) –0.16 (p = 0.870) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 1226.03(p = 0.000) 1183.83 (p = 0.000) 1199.65 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 163.45 (p = 0.286) 155.73 (p = 0.220) 145.20 (p = 0.433) 
 **, *** represent significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1 
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Table 9 
System GMM regression of earnings management on women directorship, attributes derived from 
PCA and female executives 
Variables  
 
   Model 1     Model 2 Model 3 
    Coef.       t–test    Coef. t–test    Coef.   t–test 
Lag CDA 0.075*** 6.24 0.075*** 7.45 0.074*** 7.90 
WDIR (%)   0.696*** 29.61   
WDIR_NB     0.107*** 20.38 
AUDCOM_MEMB –0.011*** –2.93 –0.014*** –4.18 –0.010*** –3.15 
LEADERSHIP 0.053*** 11.64 0.032*** 16.29 0.037*** 16.86 
EXPERTISE –0.012*** –2.59 –0.018*** –5.35 –0.011*** –3.02 
EXPERIENCE 0.024*** 4.89 0.015*** 5.06 0.027*** 8.94 
WCEO –0.075*** –5.56 –0.026 –1.81 0.013 0.91 
WCFO –0.216*** –15.93 –0.065*** –6.25 –0.125*** –11.94 
B_SIZE  –0.028*** –3.76 0.094*** 13.22 –0.051*** –7.35 
B_IND –0.013 –1.11 –0.006 –0.66 0.008 0.81 
B_MEET  –0.011** –2.02 –0.009** –1.97 –0.010 –1.92 
DUAL 0.032*** 4.66 0.034*** 5.66 0.045*** 7.20 
CEO_TEN 0.009 1.68 –0.005 –1.29 –0.012*** –2.78 
FAM_OWN –0.005 –0.39 –0.075*** –7.75 –0.060*** –5.00 
INST_OWN –0.040*** –3.26 –0.045*** –4.57 –0.046*** –4.04 
BIG 0.027*** 5.23 0.008** 2.39 0.019** 4.22 
LEV –0.016 –0.91 0.032 1.83 0.025 1.48 
TQ 0.001 0.05 0.007** 2.24 0.007** 2.07 
LOSS –0.091*** –16.67 –0.090*** –19.89 –0.093*** –16.97 
R&D –0.274*** –5.32 –0.109*** –3.43 –0.148*** –3.57 
CASH –0.192*** –5.88 –0.104*** –3.95 –0.162** –5.88 
FOR_ASSETS 0.052*** 3.32 0.025** 2.33 0.020 1.75 
BETA –0.013 –1.05 –0.024*** –2.68 –0.026** –2.45 
CROSS 0.037*** 3.21 0.026*** 2.57 0.041*** 4.28 
F_SIZE –0.002** –2.38 0.003*** 4.05 0.005 0.62 
Intercept 0.030 0.75 –0.396*** –9.62 –0.064 –1.43 
Industry (?) Yes Yes Yes 
Years (?) Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 886     886 886 
F (Prob > F) 1486.91 (p = 0.000) 1003.54 (p = 0.000) 5923.61 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(1) (z, p–value): –3.42 (p = 0.001) –3.86 (p = 0.000) –3.85 (p = 0.000) 
Arellano–Bond test AR(2) (z, p–value): 0.03 (p = 0.979) –0.26 (p = 0.792) –0.27 (p = 0.785) 
Sargan test (Chi–square, p–value): 1276.75 (p = 0.000) 1194.76 (p = 0.000) 1212.42 (p = 0.000) 
Hansen test (Chi–square, p–value): 121.03 (p = 0.121) 128.83 (p = 0.274) 127.67 (p = 0.299) 
**, *** represent significance at 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1 
 
